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linguistic manifestation. It then sketches several leading conceptions of social organization, their
metaphorical origin and entailments. Finally, it contextualizes the use of these metaphors in conversation,
which leads to the main thesis of this essay that the reconstitutability of networks of conversation
precedes all other criteria of the viability of organizational forms. The paper transcends the traditional
second-order cybernetic preoccupation with individual cognition – observation and description – into the
social domain of participation.
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Social Organizations as Reconstitutable
Networks of Conversations
Klaus Krippendorff1
This essay intends to recover human agency from holistic, abstract, even oppressive conceptions of
social organization, common in the social sciences, social systems theory in particular. To do so, I
am taking the use of language as simultaneously accompanying the performance of and constructing
reality (my version of social constructivism). The essay starts with a definition of human agency in
terms of its linguistic manifestation. It then sketches several leading conceptions of social
organization, their metaphorical origin and entailments. Finally, it contextualizes the use of these
metaphors in conversation, which leads to the main thesis of this essay that the reconstitutability of
networks of conversation precedes all other criteria of the viability of organizational forms. The
paper transcends the traditional second-order cybernetic preoccupation with individual cognition –
observation and description – into the social domain of participation.

Imagine, they gave a war and nobody showed up
Carl Sandburg2

Human Agency
It is common to associate human agency with the capacity to make choices that cause
changes in the world. As such, human agency is closely associated with free will, the
philosophical doctrine that distinguishes choices from unthinking causal
determinisms. This doctrine also posits that the capacity of humans to act is
individual. Freedom is another largely individualist if not mentalist and certainly
politically loaded idea. Heinz von Foerster (1992, p. 14) touched upon human agency
by connecting it with formal indeterminacy when he proposed “Only those questions
that are in principle undecidable, we can decide.” I agree. Where the answer to a
question is not obtainable by applying a logical procedure or algorithm, human
agency can be exercised to propose one. I deviate from these conceptions, however,
and consider human agency a social phenomenon that reveals itself in the practice of
accountability.
The idea of accountability can be traced to C. Wright Mills's (1959) study of The
Power Elite in the U.S. To obtain data on his topic, Mills inquired into what happened
inside that elite by visiting boardrooms, observing meetings and social events where
decisions were made and implemented; and where power was exerted, yielded, and
1. Gregory Bateson Professor for Cybernetics, Language, and Culture, The Annenberg School for Communication,
University of Pennsylvania. Email: kkrippendorff@asc.upenn.edu
2. This phrase, often attributed to Bertolt Brecht was multiply translated from Carl Sandburg (1936). The People,
Yes. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Page 43: “Sometime they’ll give a war and nobody will come.”
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contested. He soon realized that the traditional macro-theoretical conception of power
was too simplistic, and discovered the richness of language used there: language not
as a medium of influence, as envisioned by rhetoric; not as a medium of
representation, as conceived in the abstract objectivist notion of language of the
enlightenment; but as interactions during which the meanings of decisions are created,
accepted or dismissed. In a landmark paper, Mills (1940) described the vocabulary of
motives that decision makers use to justify their proposals and actions. His approach
developed further (Scott & Lyman, 1968; Shotter, 1984; Buttny, 1993) and is now
discussed in terms of accountability.
To me, accountability manifests human agency, not in terms of individual/
psychological conceptions, for example, in terms of intentions, awareness of
alternatives, or rational criteria for decision making or choices, but in terms of the
accounts that human actors give to each other in response to requests or in anticipation
of being held accountable for what they say or do. The two kinds of accounts in which
agency becomes socially manifest are excuses and justifications.3 Both are
conversational moves.
•

•

Excuses deny that an actor had agency. They acknowledge that something
untoward has happened but attribute it to causes not under the actor’s control, for
example, accidents, lack of information, or being under the influence of or
command by someone else.
Justifications, by contrast, acknowledge an actors’ agency. They are offered by
actors who assume responsibility for a given situation, are convinced of the virtue
of their actions, and expect others to see their virtue as well.

Accounts may be accepted or not. Rejecting an account may lead to further
requests for accounts until the participants in the conversation are satisfied and willing
to go on to other issues. The acts of offering, accepting, and rejecting accounts
manifest human agency regarding the use of language, even if agency is denied
regarding particular occurrences.
The adequacy of accounts does not depend on whether they are true or false in any
objective sense, but on whether they are accepted as adequate within the conversations
in which they are offered. Validity could become an issue, but only if knowledge of
what an account claims is deemed relevant and available to those considering it.
Typically, accounts appeal to prevailing values or ethical considerations. Whether they
prevail indeed, depends not on anyone’s unasserted convictions but on being accepted
as adequate.
According to John Shotter (1984), people do not speak and act in the presence of
others without having appropriate accounts ready if requested. Moreover, people do
3. A third account, incidentally occurring most frequently in conversations, is explanation. Explanations have to do
with understanding. They indicate conversational competence and cognitive autonomy and have the effect of
coordinating understanding, without the assumption of sharing. This ability and its consequence is only
marginally related to human agency and not central to this essay.
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not offer accounts without anticipation that they have a chance of being understood
and accepted by those who matter to them. Thus, explicit human communication
always takes place against the background of an implicit operating consensus
regarding held values, plausible reasons, and coherent constructions of reality. Where
this background is at odds with the articulated foreground, accounting practices bring
that operating consensus to the surface and renegotiate it as needed.
Cognitive correlates of conversation, even intents to deceive, are irrelevant unless
someone suspects such motivations to be disingenuous, challenges them by requesting
appropriate accounts that either expose them or puts the suspicion to rest. The absence
of accounts signals acceptance of what was said and done for no apparent reasons.4
Accepting excuses certifies a participant's lack of agency in the instance in
question, and accepting justifications credits if not expresses appreciation of a
participant's exercise of agency in that instance. Thus, human agency, surfaces in
accounting practices, and as such is an entirely social and interactive phenomenon, not
divorceable from the conversational use of language.
The Metaphorical Grounding of Social Organization
Social organizations exist only virtually. One cannot point to them. One cannot
observe them. One cannot talk to them. Yet, people can practice them as members and
receive something in return for their participation or are affected in interactions with
people who act in the name of an organization. This virtuality invites the use of
metaphors to understand and live with their objectifications. It is not surprising,
therefore, that most theories of organization rely on metaphors to characterize their
objects. What theorists rarely realize, however, is that all metaphors have entailments
that unwittingly direct their users’ attention to particular features worthy of
investigation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Acting on these entailments has ontogenetic
implications, here, constructing what organizations “really are.” Let me sketch the
metaphorical origin of five key conceptions of organization.
•

Family metaphors are of ancient origin. It is easy to see how the basic idea of
family, consisting of individuals and including responsible adults, is
metaphorically extendable to larger social forms: tribes, feudal forms,
monarchies, even the Catholic Church. One entailment of the use of family
metaphors is that members have no choice regarding where they belong, are childlike, and in need of having to be taken care of by those privileged or more
knowledgeable. So, rulers have to take care of their subjects, and priests see
themselves as shepherds of their followers.

4. The unproblematic acceptance of what is said or done includes the acceptance of authority/dependency relations.
However, denying accountability or punishing those who are asking for it, which ends up in the fear of holding
authorities accountable for what they say and do manifests the exertion of power—I would say “illegitimate
power” inasmuch as accountability is a universal of language use.
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Machine metaphors of social forms emerged in the industrial era. Factory owners
did not own their workers but hired them to perform specific functions which they
designed in the service of their factory's purpose. This metaphor made factory
workers replaceable when they turned out to be inefficient or defective, like the
parts of a machine. Machine metaphors also introduced logical hierarchies with
the functions of ordinary workers below and various levels of supervisory
functions above them, always leading to factory owners who had no
responsibilities to anyone but to that factory yielding a profit as a whole. Max
Weber described prototypical bureaucracies (incidentally during the same era) in
terms of rational differentiations and assignment of functions to impersonal
offices. Their structure logically followed from the overall purpose, (form follows
function) and office workers had to perform according to specifications, satisfying
the overall design.
Biological metaphors are responsible for the very word organization, literally the
shaping of something into an organism. Much like machines, organisms tend to be
analyzed in terms of hierarchies of functions.5 However, biological metaphors do
not insist on the replaceability of the members of social organizations (see the
concept of autopoiesis, Maturana & Varela, 1988) but on harmonious
collaboration among them, but always with the larger whole in mind.
Collaboration demands that members adjust their functions relative to each other
and subordinate their collaboration to an organization's well-being. Conflicts that
could arise within organizations, the analogue of diseases, are considered
dysfunctional and in need of resolution to restore normality. Parsons (1951) Social
System and Bertalanffy’s (1968) General System Theory exemplify metaphorical
generalizations of biological organisms.
Person metaphors are at home largely in legal discourse and politics. Legal
discourse considers corporations as entities that allow groups of individuals to act
as if they were a single composite individual for certain purposes, for example,
lawsuits, property ownership, and contracts. By extending laws, originally
regulating individual conduct, to corporate entities, legal scholars encountered
difficulties and aptly consider corporate personhood a “legal fiction.” In politics,
states are often personalized as friendly, hostile, authoritarian or democratic, or
trustworthy. The attribution of individual characteristics to countries typically
directs international relations. Person metaphors of social organization entail little
about the nature of individual membership, except that they enable designated
individuals, spokes persons, presidents, CEOs, or hired lawyers to represent and
speak for them in particular proceedings.

5. It is not entirely clear whether the etymology of “function” is routed in technology or in biology. In any case, it is
now a defining concept of biological discourse, enabling explanations of how the parts that biologists distinguish
within an organism interact in the service of that organism as the a whole entity. Engineers consider functions in
their analysis of technological artifacts with the difference that technical functions are intended by design,
whereas biological functions offer useful part-whole explanations.

Social Organizations as Networks of Conversations

•

153

Network metaphors, communication nets in particular, focus attention on the
relations among component parts of social organizations. Connections may be
close or far apart, direct or indirect, or used heavily or lightly. Calling networks
heterarchical suggests them to be antithetical to hierarchies. Hierarchies, however,
are mere special cases of networks. Network metaphors of organizations say little
about who occupies the nodes of a network – individuals, offices, or whole
organizations. There is no implication of functions, suggesting that wholes do not
determine the nodes. Networks may cross the boundaries of particular
organizations.

Etymologically, family metaphors gave way to machine metaphors. U.S. slavery
occurred in that transition. Slaves were traded but still had to be cared for. Machine
metaphors were vastly enriched by the introduction of biological metaphors, still
dominant in the current literature on organizations. Network metaphors liberalize the
biological ones but have not replaced them as is evident in suggestions that
organizations have networks, for example of communication (Monge & Contractor,
2003). I shall make use of the network metaphor below, suggesting that organizations
are realized in networks of conversations.
All metaphors have entailments (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Except for network
metaphors, the above metaphors share three quite unfortunate ones.
(1) Organizations are whole entities. At least legal discourse acknowledges that
corporations are legal fictions; not in the awareness of their metaphorical construction,
but in the experience that corporations—unlike individual human beings—do not
speak and thus complicate issues of legal accountability. Organizational theorists
rarely recognize the metaphorical ground of their concepts of organization and look
for evidence of what are their entailments outside of language. Indeed, such evidence
can be found in the enduring manifestations of organizational identities: the consistent
use of their names, logos, and uniforms for employees; the buildings, equipment,
products, and other assets in their name; and various published records, addresses,
advertisements, the trading value of their stocks, and various statistics. Consistent
with the idea of organizations as entities is the idea that their manifestations persist for
some time. When they exceed the life span of their individual members, these
metaphors encourage the belief that organizations are more real and more important
than their human constituents.
But it is in language that such manifestations are identified with particular
organizations and it is in language that they could vanish by disuse.
(2) Organizational members continue in their organization. This is obviously
misleading. Unlike machines and biological organisms whose parts or organs cannot
rearrange themselves and are permanently in place and coupled to each other, people
cannot be so tied up. Most social organizations cease activity after working hours, on
weekends and holidays, in the absence of appropriate members, but may reconstitute
themselves under certain conditions. People have choices to participate in various
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social organizations, typically sequentially. Theories of the internal working of social
organizations, which account for almost all organizational research, cannot reveal how
organizations are constituted or what creates their reality and for whom.
(3) The viability of the whole determines the practices of its parts. This
whole→part determinism leads to theories of organizational hierarchies, how power is
exercised, and how members of an organization, as a condition of being its member,
perform the functions necessary to sustain it. Yet, wholes cannot exist without their
constituent parts. Wholes are abstractions that reside in language, including in
conversations among the constituents of organizations. Theories that make use of
these metaphors effectively reverse the actual determinism involved and are unable to
explain how organizations could arise. Such theories of organization are theories of
how human agency can be suppressed and directed to abstract ends.6
Reconstitutability
To recover human agency in conceptions of social organization I am suggesting that
the central feature of all social organizations is not their persistence and overall well
being but their reconstitutability at different times, with same or different people, and
perhaps at different locations.
As already suggested, social organizations do not require continuous existence. A
parliament is sometimes in session and mostly not. Taking a seminar at a university,
means showing up for agreed upon periods of time, actively participating as a student,
but thereafter being free to participate in other organizational forms: eating with costudents at a dining hall, taking part in a political discussion, competing in a sports
event, working at a job, populating traffic on the way home, and partying with friends.
When the right number and kind of people meet at the right time, such as when
employees show up for work at 9 am or when the members of a family sit down for a
dinner conversation after everyone worked at various places, appropriate
organizational forms can arise.
Individuals who repeatedly reconstitute the same social organizations know each
other well and when they meet after a period of practicing other organizations, they
may continue where they had left off. In periods of inactivity, a social organization is
reduced to a mere possibility.
Not all organizations are reconstituted by a bodily same set of individuals. For
example, a court of law comes into being when a case is to be adjudicated, all required
constituents are present, and constituents conduct themselves as expected. That court
may, however, involve a different cast of individuals each time. The reconstitutability
of a court of law is institutionalized in the sense that its organizational practices are
well known by potential participants who may signify their qualifications to each
other. The signification of qualifications is evident in doctors wearing white coats
while patients do not; in police officers using flashing lights on their cars while
6. Incidentally, this picture of organization is of prime interest to managers of organizations or their CEOs who tend
to assume the ability to control their members by defining the purposes of the whole.
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ordinary drivers would be prosecuted if they do; in shop keepers standing behind a
counter and customers in front of it; and in car mechanics wearing typical working
clothes and disallowing clients from entering their workshop. When such signifiers are
reliably recognized, and complement one’s potential role in a desired organization, it
is easy for the potential constituents of an organization to fall into their roles.
Institutionalization may involve impersonal signifiers, place holders that enable
individuals to move into institutionally defined spaces: an empty seat on a bus, the
public space in a bank, a job application form, or a theatre ticket. Such signifiers invite
or license an actor to become a particular constituent of a social organization – a rider
on a bus, a bank customer, a job applicant, or a member of a theatre audience –
temporarily, by choice, and in the knowledge of what is expected by occupying these
places.
Most importantly, reconstitutability presupposes human agency. If individuals
would not initiate interactions that reconstitute a social organization, that organization
could not come into being. The process of reconstitution distinguishes social
organizations from machines, whose parts do not know each other and are assembled
by a designer or user, and from organisms that have evolved and must maintain
uninterrupted autopoiesis (Maturana & Varela, 1988) as a condition of their living.
Even families cannot exist without the bodily participation of their members, whatever
their relationships may be. All social organizations are either active, dissolved and
waiting to be reconstituted when potential constituents so desire, or have ceased
forever. Examples of no longer reconstitutable organizations are lost crafts, dead
languages, and dictatorships after a true revolution.
The ability of individual actors to reconstitute a social organization supersedes all
other conditions of a social organization’s viability. For example, there are viable
organizations that make no profit. There are viable organizations that shrink in size.
There are viable organizations whose members do not get paid but have to pay their
way into it. There are viable organizations that have no apparent utility, like birthday
parties or soccer games. There are viable organizations whose members dread what
they are asked to do but do it anyway. But there are no social organizations whose
members refuse or are unable to reconstitute them for whatever reasons.
Social organizations in which some constituents hold other constituents captive in
continuous membership, like in prisons or slavery, offer the latter no alternatives to
realize themselves in diverse social organizations, prevent them from developing their
own identities, robbing them of their inalienable human agency. Theories of social
organization that attend only to how individuals function within organizations flirt
with totalitarianism by failing to recognize or deliberately ignoring that individual
members of an organization voluntarily, contractually, and temporarily trade some of
their human agency for the benefits of participating in that organization, regardless of
their motivation. Since reconstitutability is a prerequisite for social organizations to
come into being, human-centered research needs to turn its attention to why
individuals are willing to give up some of their human agency for benefits they might
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be receiving while participating in social organizations, and how they manage to
reconstitute organizations and negotiate their participation.
Networks of Conversations
I am suggesting that all social organizations are realized, come to life, as networks of
conversations (Ford, 1999; Fonseca, 2002, p. 47ff; Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 66-68;
Kimberley & Fernbach, 2006). Conversations are self-organizing, more or less free
flowing verbal interactions among mutually identifiable human actors (Gadamer,
1982, pp. 330-341; Holquist, 1990, pp. 40-66; Nofsinger, 1999; Todorov, 1988; Buber,
1958). Conversations are cooperative practices and what they leave behind are joint
accomplishments (Shotter, 1993). Networks of conversations network these practices.
Accordingly, organizations are not entities but conversational practices. People
practice organization as participants. This is the gestalt switch needed to escape the
determinism entailed by the above mentioned metaphors of social organization. In
conversations one can distinguish utterances between turns of talk (Volosinov, 1986,
pp. 45-98), performatives (Austin, 1962), including the above-mentioned accounts,
recursive con-sensual coordinations of actions (Maturana, 1988), speech acts like
assertives, expressives, directives, declaratives, and commissives to engage in certain
activities (Searle, 1969), language games (Wittgenstein, 1958), stories (Fisher, 1987),
and artifacts (Krippendorff, 2006). Conversations are prototypically face-to-face, but
may take place also by telephone and electronic communications. The number of
participants in a conversation is usually limited to the amount of attention individuals
can devote to each other. While it is possible for people to meet in numbers that make
individual identifiably difficult – public performances, religious gatherings, or
political demonstrations, which include spectators – these meetings almost always are
the outgrowth of preceding conversations, temporally make some participants featured
performers and others silent but necessary observers, but are likely to fuel subsequent
conversations. All conversations coordinate the activities and reality constructions of
their participants.
Minimally, conversations leave behind their own histories of what happened,
available to all who contributed to them, which serve as the expanding ground for
future conversations. Most conversations accompany, define and direct ongoing
activity, whether consuming food during a dinner conversation, negotiating a
document to satisfy all those present, or committing participants to a policy or course
of action and monitoring its results. The realities that may emerge in conversations are
not entirely cognitive as Glasersfeld (1995, 2008) insists but social in the sense that
they are being coordinated across individual constructions, usually in mutual respect
for their differences (Krippendorff, 1996).
Conversations may become networked in at least four ways.
(i)

Most often, conversations are networked sequentially, with participants moving
from one conversation to another, taking what had transpired in preceding
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conversations into a current one. Supervisors may so move, introducing
coherences that coordinate conversations in effect. So does the complement of
supervision: delegation to conversations among representatives of previous
conversations. But more typical is that members or organizations rotate through
various conversations concerned with different topics of organizational
significance.
(ii) Conversation may become networked operationally, such as when the products
of one part of an organization serve as the prerequisite for another part to
proceed. Operational networks tend to be more horizontal with participants
engaged in negotiating the interfaces between their respective conversations.
(iii) Conversations may also be networked emotionally and informally, like among
friends, people who share extra-organizational interests, or acquaintances
willing to do each other favors.
(iv) Conversations may be networked by sharing documents generated in one
conversation and made available to others. The reading of documents – reports,
rules, and resolutions – can network conversations without direct human
contact. Texts circulating in a network of conversations may preserve histories
of organizational practices beyond the capacity of individual memories and
regulate that network.
Coordinating a network of conversations takes place entirely within that network
and consists of conversations about conversations that recursively construct their own
conversational realities (Shotter, 1993). As individuals move through various
conversations, that network may become more coherent and navigable for its
participants. A crucial ingredient of this coordination is the development of
vocabularies about conversational practices, including motivational mission
statements, working schedules, network ethics, operational practices, success stories,
logos, and products – all of which are conversational accomplishments that can give
the participants in conversations a sense of making a difference and feeling to belong.
One cannot prevent the above metaphors of organization from entering networks
of conversations and causing their entailments to be realized therein, as is common. I
am suggesting that the vocabularies of current theories of organization, which may
well be regarded as expert accounts, have the effect of concealing their conversational
nature, reifying the holistic, abstract, and functional conceptions of organization they
describe, and denying places for human agency. This does not need to be so and this
essay hopes to discourage the unreflective use of such metaphors in networks of
conversation.
In other words, the vocabularies, which are saturated with the above-mentioned
metaphors of organization, should be replaced (Rorty, 1989) by vocabularies of the
conversational moves that individuals may or may not want to make in reconstituting
networks of conversations and practicing organization. Practicing organization may
well involve suspending some human agency otherwise available, but now reflectively,
for limited times, not unconditionally.
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Infrastructures of Organization
The reconstitutability of organizations is enhanced when the histories of conversations
are not merely remembered by their participants, but also encoded in reusable
infrastructures: human bodies, texts, and technological artifacts.
Human bodies are not merely biological phenomena. The body we know as ours
has passed through a complex history of socializations, causing successful habits,
memories, and abilities to develop that, without access to that history, may well appear
natural and common. Literacy is just one example. Language is a human artifact with
reading and writing being a later invention that has transformed society as it has
trained the human body to be part of it. As Bakhtin reminds us, the words we read and
write are learned, but their origins are mostly forgotten (Holquist, 1990), together with
the alternatives they replaced. We read nearly automatically without knowing how we
do it. The word nearly is important because human agency, as I defined it, is the
exception to bodily automatisms.
Texts may be read
(i) As protocols of what transpired in prior conversations. Such protocols may
avoid repetition and may serve as an efficient way to induct newcomers into to a
conversation. This essay could be regarded as a protocol that acknowledges
voices from previous conversations I had, for example with James Taylor from
Montreal, Pille Bunnell from Vancouver, and others who commented on its first
draft, as well as the works of other authors mentioned
(ii) As exemplars to be reconsidered or rules of conduct that have proven useful in
the past of some conversations, to be generalized to other conversations
(iii) As contracts to temporarily suspend one's agency in collaboration with present
and future practitioners of organization, fixing individual commitments to
perform organizational practices inside and across the boundaries of an
organization.
Identifying something as text presumes its readability, nothing more. As such,
texts contain nothing, mean nothing, possess no symbolic or sign qualities, and convey
no information on their own. The meaning of text arises in the process of reading it.
Literate bodies make it difficult to read a text idiosyncratically. Conversations
coordinate the reading of texts. When reading jointly, starting with parents reading to
their children and continuing to discussing a text at a graduate seminar, reading
becomes coordinated among participants who can always ask “what do you mean by
that,” including “I do not understand, please explain” (Krippendorff, 2008). This does
not mean that readers read a text the same way, only that answering questions about
the meaning of texts amounts to a con-sensual coordination of their interpretations.
The reader of documents retrieved from the internet assumes that its author is
similarly coordinated. Hence reading assumes belonging to the same or a similar
community.
In organizations, all texts have memory and regulative functions, memory
functions in as much as texts extend the accessible history of recurrent conversations
beyond the lifespan of individual participants, and regulative functions as they
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encourage desirable conduct or commit members to perform certain tasks. For
example, when an organization is considered a legal entity, members are required to
conformity to certain practices, regarding fellow employees, the public, the court, and
the state. These requirements certainly direct their conversations.
Networks of conversations are likely to institutionalize their recurrent
conversational practices, using technological artifacts that improve these networks’
efficiency: telephone lines, archives, and computational devices for transmission,
storage, retrieval of documents. Such artifacts trade two consequences. On the one
hand, they extend desirable human dimensions such as communicating across
distances not reachable by the human voice or browsing the internet for documents
that would take an individual's life time to find. On the other hand, they impose
constraints perhaps considered less important such as using text instead of voice,
smell, and touch. Technological infrastructure also includes buildings to house faceto-face conversations, workplaces whose proximity facilitates informal conversations,
and access to communicational artifacts.
Revisiting Human Agency
I oppose trivializing the concept of human agency by attributing agency to texts and
technological artifacts as in actor-network theory (ANT) (Latour, 1998, 2005). As
already suggested, texts are created within a community and acquire meanings by its
literate members reading them. Texts may be read for pleasure, information, providing
instructions, as declarations, promises or threats. Although speech act theory claims
illocutionary forces at work (Searle, 1969), the consequences of reading and acting on
what is read or listened to is not causally determined—notwithstanding that literate
bodies can be trained to give this appearance. The literary conventions of a community
merely favor some readings more than others and thus limit the range of acceptable
interpretations. It is not far fetched to extend the notion of literacy to the human use of
technological artifacts. Computer literacy is an obvious example. It needs to be
acquired. And so is driving a car which is subject to numerous laws and requires one’s
coordination with other drivers. While technological artifacts exhibit physical
constraints on their usability, which are almost completely absent in texts, the use of
both is subject to conventions, not inherent to them.
ANT attributes agency to texts and artifacts inasmuch as they impose constraints
on their readers or users—just as Niklas Luhmann (1995) attributes agency to
communication by suggesting that it produces further communication, regardless of
what people do with them. True, in everyday life we might blame a car for breaking
down on us and say that a computer guides us through the steps to purchase an airline
ticket, but these are artifacts of grammar. Standard European languages happen to
provide the option to connect active subjects and passive objects by predicates. But
language has other constructions as well. It is also true that the instructions from a
boss weigh more than a marginal newspaper story. But this unequal weight does not
stem from exposure to a text but from how one’s relationship to its author is
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conceived. The Bible is important to Christians but means little to those who do not
believe it to be the word of God. For Latour, an actant is anything that behaves, affects
something else, or is seen as the source of activity. He conceives human actors as a
subspecies of actants and takes from semiotics “the crucial practice to grant texts and
discourses the ability to define also their context, their authors –in the text–, their
readers –in fabula– and even their own demarcation and metalanguage. All the
problems of the analyst are shifted to the ‘text itself’” (1998, p. 6).
In response to Latour I wish to point out that one cannot hold texts accountable for
how readers read them. Texts contain nothing. Their meanings arise in the process of
reading and coordinating one’s reading in conversations with other readers. In this
sense, meanings are dialogical accomplishments (Krippendorff, 2003). The
illocutionary forces that speech acts supposedly possess cannot compel readers to act,
They are generated in the process of reading. Texts cannot speak for anyone unless
readers imagine their authors from previous conversations. They cannot provide
information unless readers read them in the context of what interests them. Texts
cannot object to their interpretations. If texts constrain then only because readers
construct their meanings as limiting their choices. If texts open opportunities then
only because readers come to see opportunities not realized before. Texts do not talk,
readers do, including about how they read them. Theorizing the agency of text
effectively trivializes human agency.
Attributing agency to technological artifacts amounts to a similar trivialization.
All artifacts are created and put in place by human agents. Some artifacts, once set in
motion may proceed without further human attention – thermostatically controlled
home heating systems, traffic signals, automatic pilots and algorithms for buying and
selling stocks. Mechanisms like these are computationally, structurally, or causally
determined, but their use is not. Some artifacts survive their creators, cities for
example. Settling on cars as a preferred means of transportation, may preempt options
available to future citizens. However, options and possibilities are concepts associated
with human agents, not with physics. Matter matters but does not determine what
human agents do with it. Technological artifacts, like texts, do not speak, cannot
account for how they are being used, and what they end up doing.
Attributing agency to non-human entities is way of absolving one’s agency. In
accounting terms, such attributions are excuses. When accepted, they results in a loss
of autonomy and deny future accountability. Thus, trivializing human agency needs to
be discouraged.
For the implications of this essay to cybernetics see Klaus Krippendorff (2008,
pp. 173-184 in this issue of C&HK)
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